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ow can economic success emerge in the midst of 
political chaos and civil war? This is the question 
raised by the experience of Berbera, a successful 
port located on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden, in 
the former British protectorate of Somaliland. Berbera’s 
traffic has been rising steadily over the past decade. For 
example its traffic of import containers has nearly doubled 
between 2003 and 2007 (MNPC 2010). This port’s promis- 
ing position is confirmed by the fact that Bolloré Africa 
Logistics, the biggest port operator in Africa, has recently 
announced  its plan to invest massively in Berbera’s  port 
and its transport  corridor with the Ethiopian capital city, 
Addis Ababa.1 
Somaliland’s small  population,   estimated  at  about 
3.5 million people, benefits from two main kinds of physical 
assets: its pastoral assets of grazing land and livestock, on the 
one  hand,  and  its transport  infrastructure,  on  the  other 
hand. The latter includes mainly the port of Berbera and, to 
a lesser extent, the airport of Hargeysa, its capital city, as well 
as their connecting roads. The nomadic herdsmen need the 
port of Berbera for exporting their livestock to the Arabian 
Peninsula and other Middle Eastern countries, which pro- 
vide their main outlet. Moreover, Berbera is ideally located 
to give a convenient access to the Indian Ocean to neigh- 
boring landlocked Ethiopia, and there is a main road 
between the two countries.2 
Ethiopia’s  Ogaden province across the  border  is also 
peopled by Somali-speaking herdsmen, and that border is 
 
traditionally fairly porous, as might be expected in a land 
mostly devoted to nomadic pastoral activity. Refugees have 
crossed this border back and forth over the past decades, 
depending on the changing intensity of fighting during the 
Ethiopian civil war, which ended in 1991, and the ongoing 
one in Somalia that began in 1991. The best grazing land, 
called the Haud, straddles this border, which nomadic 
herdsmen also routinely cross (Doornbos  1993, map 6.1, 
101). While ethnically homogenous, these Somali-speaking 
people of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Soma- 
liland are traditionally affiliated with different clans that 
straddle these countries’ borders and that at times enter 
into violent conflict with one another. The chaos that pre- 
vails in most of Somalia, which has been engulfed in war- 
lordism and banditry ever since the collapse of the state in 
1991, testifies to the threat of violence that looms over these 
people. Siyad Barre’s military government had launched an 
unsuccessful invasion of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in 1978 
and eventually signed a peace agreement with the Mengistu 
regime in 1988, which was perceived as a disgrace by many 
Somalians. Many military officers from the north, mainly 
from the Isaaq clan, which is the largest one in Somaliland, 
accused Siyad Barre of having mishandled the operation. 
They felt that the conquest of a more limited area in the 
Ogaden, including mainly the grazing land of the Isaaq 
clan, could have been a success. The peace agreement with 
Ethiopia triggered a full-blown civil war in Somalia, 
because many clans wanted to hang on to the pan-Somali 
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project, and a coup d’état toppled the military regime in 
1991. Chaos ensued, and Somalia collapsed into a stateless 
entity. Nevertheless, in the nearly two decades since 
Somaliland seceded from Somalia, it has managed to 
develop the port of Berbera and to enforce an acceptable 
enough level of security on the paved road linking it to 
Ethiopia for the traders to adopt this route. A large share 
of Ethiopia’s international trade is now shipped through 
this port. This achievement stands in sharp contrast to the 
chaotic remainder of Somalia. 
This chapter presents a framework for analyzing this 
unexpected success and  draws some lessons for under- 
standing state formation in general. A very simple model 
is presented that shows how the political equilibrium that 
emerged in Somaliland is fundamentally rooted in the 
need to provide security to the traders who provide most 
of Berbera’s  activity. This is a sine qua non for the traffic 
through  Berbera to be active and flourishing. This model 
sheds some light on the fairly unusual political institutions 
that  emerged from  less than  two decades of self-rule by 
Somaliland. Although some limited fighting occurred for a 
while in the early 1990s, this former British colony quickly 
engaged in a political process that led to the creation of a 
fairly successful democracy in about a decade. 
What seems very important when looking at the experi- 
ence of Somaliland is that this gradual buildup of a function- 
ing state started from the grassroots, with very little outside 
interference. Eubank (2010) emphasizes that the Somaliland 
Republic has not been recognized internationally, which 
makes it ineligible for foreign aid. In his view, this is an asset 
rather than a liability, because it forced the Somalilanders to 
develop accountable political institutions  and to engage in 
state formation in a non-Eurocentric fashion. The aim of this 
chapter is to go one step further in analyzing the type of gov- 
ernment that resulted and in particular to explain clearly why 
the “fiscal decentralization” that Eubank is looking for does 
not exist in Somaliland. The model argues instead that the 
redistribution of fiscal resources from the government to the 
different regions lies at the heart of these peaceful and demo- 
cratic institutions. The key role of redistribution in peaceful 
state-building in Africa has been emphasized in particular by 
Azam (2006). In Somaliland this redistribution of fiscal 
resources has mainly funded a significant expansion in the 
education sector in all regions of the country. Between 1997 
and 2006 the number of primary schools rose from 165 to 
516, while the number of universities increased from 1 to 5 
(MNPC 2010). 
The model presented later argues that the Somaliland 
Republic shares many features of the “indirect rule” system 
that was widely used in the days of the British Empire and 
that has been used in many developing countries since their 
independence. In particular, Boone (2003) shows how this 
system was applied quite successfully in several parts  of 
postcolonial Francophone West Africa, where the central 
government delegated the task of controlling some areas to 
some local traditional authorities, in return for some trans- 
fers. I argue here that  this system cuts through  a vexing 
“bootstrap” problem that faces all new states: a state needs to 
have fiscal resources to extend its control to various parts of 
its territory, but the state needs to have a fairly serious level 
of control to be able to raise those fiscal resources in the first 
place. This problem explains to a large extent why the con- 
trol many African states exert is in fact extremely limited, 
leaving de facto large parts of their country without any 
effective state presence, as emphasized by Herbst  (2000). 
I argue that Somaliland was put on the fast track to solve 
this problem thanks to two of its preexisting assets. First, 
this country inherited a valuable transport  infrastructure, 
which only required establishing an efficient political 
regime to become competitive in the Horn of Africa. I sug- 
gest that “ports are the taxman’s best friends,” because they 
provide a “choke point” where taxable resources are con- 
centrated and make revenue collection relatively cheap. Sec- 
ond, the traditional institutions of this nomadic pastoral 
society had not been destroyed by either British colonial rule, 
or the subsequent “modernizer” national government of 
post-colonial Somalia, despite the brutal attacks by the 
Mogadishu government in the final years of Siyad Barre’s 
rule in the late 1980s (Lewis 2008). That indiscriminate vio- 
lence against civilians and soldiers alike probably helped the 
Somalilanders to achieve a consensus on the project to 
secede from Somalia and build a state of their own. The clans 
with which Somali nomadic herdsmen are affiliated are 
themselves subdivided into kinship groups, which are sub- 
ject quite informally but firmly to the leadership of the eld- 
ers. There is no real “chiefdom” among the Somali, unlike in 
many other African societies (Lewis 2008), but the elders 
exert a significant level of authority. 
This power was successfully harnessed to the emerging 
Somaliland Republic by creating a House of the Elders, 
called Gurti in Somali, in addition to a more standard 
elected House of Representatives. This upper house is play- 
ing a part in Somaliland’s bicameral system close to that 
played by the House of Lords in Britain’s Westminster sys- 
tem, allowing the traditional authorities to be involved 
directly in running the country’s affairs. I argue that this is 
one of the fundamental pillars of this country, because it is 
the key to establishing—at a low up-front cost—the required 
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level of security for making the port of Berbera an economic 
success and hence a reliable source of fiscal revenues. The 
emerging Somalilander government is in fact delegating to 
the elders the task of controlling violence and banditry, with 
a view to protecting the traders who then pay taxes in return 
for the transport services of Somaliland and its port. Then, 
the redistribution of fiscal revenues pointed out by Eubank 
(2010), as mentioned above, is the natural compensation 
for the investment made by the elders in providing the key 
public good that makes this lucrative trade possible. Hence, 
my approach  to  Somaliland’s state-building  shares some 
features of the so-called “property rights” approach to the 
theory of the firm (Hart 1995). The returns to the transport 
infrastructure inherited by Somaliland thus depend cru- 
cially on the “relationship-specific investments” (Hart 1995) 
made by the elders in controlling violence and banditry, 
which is in turn rewarded by some redistribution of fiscal 
revenues. Similarly, Hart’s theory rests on “incomplete con- 
tracts theory,” which assumes that only a fraction of the 
observable information can be used as part of an enforce- 
able contract, while the rest is not  verifiable by a court, 
although it is observable by the parties to the contract. My 
model pushes this to the extreme, because there is no third 
party that  can be called upon  to enforce any agreement 
between the government and the clans’ elders. 
The solution offered here to this fundamental commit- 
ment problem brings out the key theoretical contribution 
made by the current  model relative to Alesina and Spo- 
laore’s theory of the size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore 
2003). These authors define the government as a country’s 
monopoly producer of a public good that affects its people 
differentially. They then raise serious doubts about the pos- 
sibility of compensating people for these differential bene- 
fits by transfers, because of the lack of commitment of the 
democratic government that they assume. In the model 
presented here, the government is unable to produce the 
public good alone and must rely on the traditional author- 
ities that are in a position to control violence and banditry, 
provided their participation is satisfied through a transfer. 
Then, the promise of this transfer can be made credible in 
a repeated-game framework because the recipients can 
punish any deviation by the government by reducing dras- 
tically its payoff in case of cheating. This implicit threat is 
credible because the recipient of the transfer is incurring a 
positive opportunity cost in delivering its part of the deal. 
Hence, what looks like a transfer is in fact the price paid for 
a productive service sold to the government. 
More generally, the state-formation  theory sketched 
below views the state as a means to internalize some key 
externality that has the potential to enlarge the opportunity 
set of the players, provided a fair compensation is paid to 
the investors. This is why redistribution  plays such a key 
role in African state-building, as mentioned above. The rea- 
son for this result is that the basic negative externality that 
plagues African states is the threat of civil war or, more gen- 
erally, the threat of violence. If I become armed, then your 
expected welfare goes down, because there is a non-zero 
probability that I will use these weapons to attack you. This 
is what the “social contract” aims at preventing, by provid- 
ing a fair and credible compensation for giving up one’s 
weapons (Azam and  Mesnard 2003). In  Somaliland the 
threat was more directed at the economy, because any inse- 
curity felt by the traders would have brought the port of 
Berbera to  a halt. Nevertheless, this implicit threat  was 
overcome through a gradual bottom-up  process leading to 
the emergence of the democratic regime. 
 
 
A MODEL OF TRADERS UNDER THREAT 
 
After the breakup of Somalia, law and order collapsed, and 
the country became prey to roving bandits and warlords, 
making trade highly risky. However, Somaliland itself man- 
aged to isolate a relative safe haven for traders. The following 
model aims at bringing out the two levels of political organi- 
zation that made this possible. I first analyze how the tradi- 
tional system of social control was mobilized for reining in 
uncontrolled violence. The next section shows how a higher 
level of political cooperation was needed to create the 
required level of security for making Berbera a success. 
 
 
The traders 
 
A very simple model was chosen for capturing the key part 
played by security in determining the level of trade going 
through Somaliland and Berbera. Let V be the value of the 
goods transported through the country by the traders. The 
traders potentially incur three types of costs while moving 
across the country. First, there is a resource cost involved 
in  trucking the shipments, including fuel and labor. Sec- 
ond, there is a possibility that bandits might rob the trader 
along the way, leaving him without anything to sell at the 
port; the probability that  this happens  is denoted  as p. 
Last, I assume that the lucky traders who have not been 
raided have to pay a tax on the goods leaving the country 
at the fixed rate t. On the export side, I thus assume that 
the tax is paid at the port, and on the import side, at the 
end of the trip, that is, mainly at the border for the transit 
trade to Ethiopia. We assume that the government controls 
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corruption well enough so that the tax rate is fixed before 
other agents make their decisions and does not respond to 
the observed trade flow coming through its control points. 
All the parameters of the model are assumed to be common 
knowledge, so that all the players can correctly anticipate 
the decisions made later on by the other players. The 
traders are assumed to play last, that is, to make their deci- 
sion to start the trip or not while taking t and p as given. 
It is realistic to assume that there is no free entry in the 
trading business, mainly because of the limited warehouse 
capacity and restricted credit that is typical in poor coun- 
tries. In Africa long-distance traders usually belong to some 
long-established family networks  (Grégoire and  Labazée 
1993). Assuming for the sake of simplicity a quadratic cost 
function, then the representative trader chooses Berbera 
rather than any other port of the Red Sea or the Gulf of 
Aden area if: 
The potential bandits and the government 
 
How would the potential bandits behave in a hypothetical 
society where the  traditional  clan authorities  would fail 
somehow to organize their activity? I assume that there are 
N bandits who sequentially choose whether or not to raid a 
shipment. I make the simplest assumption  regarding the 
cost of raiding the traders, namely, that a fraction 0 < g  < 1 
of the shipment is lost in each raiding. This might capture 
the collateral damage of any fighting between the bandits 
and the traders, or any other form of cost that the bandits 
incur in raiding. This assumption is the simplest, but most 
results below are robust  to several extensions. Given this 
cost function, a given bandit i ∈{1, . . . ,N} takes the decision 
xi ∈{0,1} to raid a trader to maximize his expected profit 
simply defined as: 
 
Bi = maxxi xip(1–g )vi, (9.5) 
 
E = max (1 − τ )(1 − π )v − v  ≥ r 
 
(9.1) 
where p is the probability a raid is successful once under- 
taken and vi  is the value of the traffic faced by bandit  i, v 2v 
 
where r is the trader’s reservation profit, which he could 
expect to earn while using an alternative trade route and v– 
is the maximum carrying capacity of this route. From the 
first-order condition, the amount  of trade going through 
the country if the weak inequality in (9.1) holds, is: 
which takes value 0 if the trader has been successfully raided 
earlier, and v otherwise. 
This expression implies that the bandits incur no cost at 
all if xivi = 0 either because there is no traffic to attack, or 
because they have chosen not to undertake any raiding. 
Otherwise, they loose a constant fraction of the catch when 
v = v (1 − τ )(1 − π ). (9.2) they raid a trader. When the bandits are not organized, they 
do not take into account the externality that they inflict on 
Substituting back into (9.1), I find that a positive level of 
trade will go through the country if: 
 
1/2 
other bandits when performing an attack, namely, that this 
will in turn  reduce the level of traffic that can be raided. 
Thus, any bandit has an incentive to raid a trader, which 
(1 − τ )(1 − π ) ≥ ⎛  2r ⎛ (9.3)
 implies that the probability of a successful raid eventually 
⎛ ⎛ 
⎛ v  ⎛ 
 
converges to 1 as the number of bandits grows large: 
Assuming that v– > 2r, (9.2) and (9.3) jointly imply that pN = 1–(1–p)
N and lim π N 
N →∞ 
= 1. 
when this is profitable, the level of trade will be such that: Thus, the resulting expected value of the trader’s ship- 
ment converges to zero: 
(2rv )1/2  ≤ v ≤ θ. (9.4)  
lim v N  = 0. 
 
(9.6) 
Otherwise, it will fall to zero. This simple setting thus 
captures the idea that the competitiveness of the port  of 
Berbera depends first on two parameters, namely, r and v–, 
which determine respectively the profitability of doing busi- 
ness with the competitors and the physical transport  cost 
inside the country, and then on two choice variables, p and t, 
which are determined by two key players, respectively, the 
bandits and the tax authority. In the following, I assume that 
v– is much larger than 2r, in order to capture the geographi- 
cal advantage of Berbera over its competitors. Then, Berbera 
should win, provided the two key players manage to coordi- 
nate their decisions efficiently. 
N →∞ 
 
Against this background, I can now analyze the first con- 
tribution made by the assembly of elders in the Somali clan 
society in reducing banditry. In this nomadic society, where 
the young men are spread all over the land in search of fod- 
der for their flocks, collective identity is not defined so much 
by reference to a territory as by genealogy. Moreover, in this 
potentially violent society, where herdsmen could fight over 
grass or water at any time without any witnesses, escalation 
is prevented by the widespread use of “blood compensa- 
tion,” or diya in the Somali language. This is a clever system 
for creating joint liability within the group of origin of the 
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perpetrator of a violent crime, because the whole group is 
responsible for paying the compensation required by the 
victim’s group for settling the issue. According to Bradbury 
(2008), the diya for the murder of one man is 100 camels 
(half of this for one woman), which is a very high cost for 
the group. If the diya is not paid, then the aggrieved group 
is committed to launch a war against the criminal’s group. 
This provides a strong incentive for those involved to exert 
some control over their fellow clan members, so that any 
man found guilty of a crime against a member of another 
clan would potentially be punished by his own clan, thereby 
avoiding interclan  violence as far as possible. Hence, an 
authorities to coordinate their action makes a positive 
contribution  toward efficiency by reducing raiding. This 
institution helps the clans’ leaders to internalize the nega- 
tive externalities that they would inflict on one another by 
raiding the traders without control, inducing them to 
reduce their raiding activity. 
Now, absent any political arrangement that could help 
the  government  and  the  potential  bandits  to  coordinate 
their action, the government would simply maximize its 
expected fiscal revenues, taking into  account the traders’ 
best-response function (9.2) and the bandits’ best choice: 
important service delivered by the clan is to control the vio- 
lence that could be perpetrated by its own members against 
G = maxτ  1 − πs     v 
t ,x 
, s.t. (2) holds. (9.9) 
both  the clan’s  members and  the members of the other 
clans. This gives the elders a key role in the Somali society’s 
control of violence. This power was gradually aggregated in 
Somaliland during the political buildup toward democracy 
by organizing first a large series of local meetings of elders, 
which then developed in a kind of pyramidal fashion, cul- 
minating with the creation of the national assembly of the 
elders at the  Gurti. This process is well documented  by 
Bradbury (2008). The most striking point about this process 
is that it was mainly organized and funded by the diaspora 
Proposition 1 below describes the resulting Nash equilib- 
rium that prevails in this model when the two players do not 
coordinate their actions through some political arrangement. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The uncoordinated Nash equilibrium choice of 
p  and t by  the  government and  the  syndicated bandits, 
respectively,  is: 
 
t N = p N = 1/2, (9.10) 
 
entailing a level of traffic: 
of Somalilanders who had fled the repression under  the 
Siyad Barre regime. The diaspora played a key role in many 
v N   = v  4 , 
 
(9.11) 
other parts of Somaliland’s political development and the 
emergence of democracy there. 
What can such a consolidation process deliver within my 
and the following payoffs for the bandits and the government, 
respectively, are: 
 
N  N
 
 
model society of traders and bandits? Quite obviously, such 
G   = v 16 and B = (1 − γ )v  8. (9.12) 
a consolidation process would end up creating a kind of 
syndicated banditry, which could internalize the negative 
externality involved because an increase in the raiding activ- 
ity against traders would reduce the size of the trade flow 
itself. Now, instead of problem (9.5), this coalition would 
choose the number of raids or, equivalently given equation 
(9.6), the probability  of a successful raid so to maximize: 
The next section shows how a more inclusive political 
arrangement can harness this social control mechanism 
provided by the traditional clan authorities to improve effi- 
ciency still further and reduce raiding to zero. 
 
 
REDISTRIBUTION IN THE EFFICIENT 
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 
BS  = max π (1 − γ )v , 
π 
 
such that (9.2) holds. 
(9.7) 
 
In a clan society, genealogy is the essence of social identity, 
as mentioned above. It is then natural to assume that the 
elders have a strong interest in the continuation of the clan 
It can be readily checked that this “syndicated banditry” 
equilibrium yields the following levels of raiding and traffic: 
and thus care for the welfare of the next generation. This 
can be captured by using a dynastic family model à la Barro 
π S = 1 2 and v S = v (1 − τ ) 2. (9.8) (1974). In this kind of model, each generation is affected 
by intergenerational altruism, such that the next genera- 
This implies that the mere fact of forming a coalition of 
clans is not  sufficient in general to explain why raiding 
would stop. Nevertheless, the model predicts that the cre- 
ation  of  an  institution  that  helps  the  traditional  clan 
tion’s welfare is an argument in the current generation’s util- 
ity  function.  Choi  and  Bowles (2007)  have coined  the 
expression “parochial altruism” to describe such an inter- 
generational externality and have shown how these links 
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across generations are an important asset for the survival of 
human groups in a violent society within an evolutionary 
framework. Hence, the dynastic family assumption seems 
especially appropriate for describing the behavior of a tradi- 
tional clan society like the Somali one. In this case, it is nat- 
ural to assume that the players have an infinite horizon, 
because their concern for the next generation creates a chain 
of intergenerational links up to infinity. I thus discuss the 
political setting in which banditry and warlordism can be 
eradicated by embedding the simple model of the previous 
section within an infinite-horizon repeated game frame- 
work. I then show how Somaliland’s political institutions 
knowing that it will redistribute part of the resulting revenue, 
as explained below, to compensate the potential bandits for 
their restraint. Moreover, the chosen tax rate is the same as in 
the Nash equilibrium of the previous section, at the level that 
maximizes the Laffer curve t (1–t ). Then, the traffic level is 
twice as large in this equilibrium as in the uncoordinated 
Nash equilibrium of the previous section. 
We can now prove the following: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: There exists at least one efficient political equi- 
librium with p ∗  = 0, t ∗  = 1/2 and: 
cater for the key mechanisms brought out by this model.
 
(1 −
 
)  ⎛  4 − 3δ ⎛ 3v δ
 
(9.15)
 
 
To capture their common ethnic heritage in Somaliland, 
assume that the potential bandits and the government have 
the same discount factor 0 < d < 1. Then, assume that the 
government can offer at each period the following contract 
 
 
 
 
if: 
γ v ⎛ ⎛ ⎛ 
≤ g ∗  ≤ , 
8 ⎛ 16 
 
 
 
(1 − γ )8 
to the potential syndicated bandits: “I will give you g > 0 if 
you refrain from raiding the traders and enforce p = 0”. This 
δ ≥ δ = . 
9 − 6γ 
(9.16) 
contract clearly entails that the potential syndicated bandits 
play first and the government second, after having observed 
whether the raiding was avoided or not. Moreover, no third 
party is available to enforce the promise made by the gov- 
ernment to deliver the transfer once the potential bandits 
have refrained from raiding the traders. I define an efficient 
political equilibrium as an efficient outcome that can be 
sustained ad infinitum in the repeated game between the 
government and the potential bandits. 
 
DEFINITION 1: An efficient political equilibrium is a triplet 
{t,  p,  g}  that  lies on  the  Pareto  frontier  in  the  game 
between the government and the potential syndicated 
bandits and that can be sustained by a standard trigger- 
strategy equilibrium. 
In this simple setting involving a transfer, the Pareto- 
efficient {t, p}  pair of actions by the two players can be 
derived by solving the following problem: 
The proof is rejected in the appendix, while figure 9.1 
helps the reader understand  proposition 2 intuitively. The 
downward sloping line represents the left-hand part of con- 
dition  (9.15). All the  points  located above this  line are 
acceptable for inducing the potential syndicated bandits to 
cooperate. The required transfer is lower, the more patient 
the potential bandits are. The upward sloping line repre- 
sents the right-hand  part of this condition; all the points 
located below it are acceptable for inducing the government 
to cooperate. The government is willing to pay more, the 
more patient it is. Then, the figure makes it clear that the tri- 
angle on the right labeled “acceptable triangle” is the set of 
 
 
Figure 9.1 The Efficient Political Equilibrium Set 
 
g 
 
 
(1 –g )n 
max ⎛τ (1 − π ) + π (1 − γ )⎛ v , s.t. (2) 
holds. 
t ,π 
 
(9.13) 2 
 
Using  standard  maximization  techniques  (Kuhn  and 
Tucker theorem), one finds easily that the Pareto-efficient 3n 
outcome is a corner solution that implies the following: 16 
 
 
 
 
Acceptable 
π ∗ =  0, τ ∗ = 1 2 and v ∗ = v  
2. 
(9.14)  
 
(1 –g )q 
triangle 
The intuition for this result is pretty straightforward. 
Because of the unit cost g  > 0, raiding is an inefficient way of 
collecting revenues from the traders. The government thus 
will perform all the tax collection in the efficient equilibrium, 
8 
 
d 
d 1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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all the points that are acceptable to induce cooperation by 
both players. Notice that d–, whose value is given at (9.16), 
is strictly lower than 1. This means that the set of acceptable 
{d, g∗ } is not empty, ensuring existence of at least one pos- 
sible efficient political equilibrium point. Moreover, d– is a 
decreasing function of g, so that cooperation is  easier to 
achieve, the higher is the unit cost of raiding. Hence, (9.16) 
defines a credibility frontier in the {d,  g } space, which is 
used in the next section. The intuition  for this result is 
that the stronger the comparative advantage of the govern- 
ment at collecting revenues, the easier it is for it to buy off 
credibly the potential bandits with a transfer for producing 
security for the traders. The next section exploits this intu- 
ition to diagnose why a  solution similar to Somaliland’s 
did not emerge elsewhere in Somalia. 
 
 
WHY NOT THE REST OF SOMALIA? 
 
The foregoing modeling exercise begs the question of why 
such an efficient political equilibrium did not emerge in the 
rest of Somalia. One easy answer is given by Eubank (2010), 
who claims that foreign aid played a detrimental role there, 
by relaxing the need to build accountable institutions in that 
part  of the country. Nevertheless, it is worth  going into 
more detail to look at the missed opportunities  in eastern 
and southern Somalia in order to bring out the kind of diag- 
nosis that the model above is pointing out. It emphasizes 
some more structural characteristics. 
The first point to notice is that without declaring seces- 
sion formally, the northeastern part of Somalia also built a 
bottom-up  institutional solution known as the “New 
Puntland State of Somalia,” which was founded at a con- 
ference in Garowe in 1998. This promising solution started 
among some Darod clans, in particular the Mijerteyn 
(Lewis 2008), but it was missing two of the key ingredients 
of Somaliland’s success. First, that part of the country did 
not inherit an infrastructure  asset of the same caliber as 
the port of Berbera. In fact, the Puntland ruling elite never 
lost sight of the nearby formal capital city of Mogadishu in 
the south. That is where the infrastructural assets are nat- 
urally located, despite the massive destruction brought 
about by the war. Mogadishu has two ports, one new and 
the other  old, and an international  airport. Moreover a 
road to Addis Ababa, called the “Strada Imperiale,” could 
be restored. Hence, the Puntlanders  never severed their 
links to the rest of Somalia, realizing probably that they 
would never be in a position to levy the fiscal resources 
required to cement a Puntlander social contract similar to 
the one prevailing in Somaliland. Their strategy was clearly 
leaning in the opposite direction, suggesting that they were 
just regarding the “New Puntland State” as a mere building 
block to reconstruct Somalia. Second, they did not build any 
institutional representation of the elders, because they cre- 
ated a unicameral parliament, which did not  have many 
resources in any event. In terms of the model described 
above, this lack of resources might be blamed on the lack of 
significant transport infrastructures and thus on the lower 
need for internal security. This is illustrated by the fact that 
piracy is quite active off the coast of Puntland, imposing 
some negative externality on all the ports of the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden. However, the failure to give the eld- 
ers a large enough role in the New State of Puntland is also 
probably due to the towering figure of Colonel Abdillahi 
Yusuf, who assumed first the presidency in Puntland, up to 
2001, and then won the federal presidency in Mogadishu, 
which is in fact an empty shell. Abdillahi obviously did 
not  draw the lessons of the failure of Siyad Barre’s military 
regime to create top-down a viable state in Somalia, because 
he tried also to impose his authoritarian  rule on the New 
State of Puntland. However, imposing the “rule of fear” also 
requires resources, which are dramatically lacking in 
Puntland, while they are somewhat higher in Mogadishu, 
if only because of foreign aid as mentioned above. 
Southern  Somalia once had the resources to support 
the strong authoritarian  government led by Siyad Barre, 
who for a while was aligned with the Soviet Union, which 
was playing a complicated game in the Horn  of Africa. 
Then  alliances switched, and  the  United  States became 
involved. Although southern Somalia inherited a valuable 
infrastructural asset, in addition to the sovereignty rent due 
to international recognition and foreign aid, it was facing a 
more complicated political problem than Somaliland. 
While the latter is very homogenous, with most of its pop- 
ulation involved in nomadic pastoral activity, the former 
has a sizable agricultural area, between the Shabelle and 
Jubba rivers. The Somali clans living there have a distinct 
sedentary culture, in which territory matters at least as 
much as genealogy, so the elders have a weakened role in 
social control. Moreover, there are some Bantu farmers in 
the midst of this Somali population, loosening further the 
ethnic ties in that part of Somalia. Hence, the traditional 
authorities are too weak in that part of Somalia to deliver 
the kind of social-control services available in Somaliland, 
on the one hand, while the government was too authori- 
tarian to make credible promises of redistribution, for lack 
of checks and balances, on the other hand. 
Figure 9.2 summarizes the foregoing discussion within 
the  analytical framework  presented  earlier. It  represents 
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Figure 9.2  Why Not the Rest of Somalia 
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condition  (9.16) as the downward sloping frontier repre- 
sented in the {d, g }  space. This is the credibility frontier 
defined above. The parameter g measures the cost advantage 
enjoyed by the Somalilander government over the potential 
bandits in collecting revenue, thanks to the preserved stock 
of infrastructure inherited from colonial days, and enhanced 
over the recent past by some investment. In the case of 
Puntland,  no such stock is available, as explained above, 
suggesting that g  is small there, because the government is 
not in a position to collect revenue much more efficiently 
than the potential bandits. In Southern Somalia,  g is poten- 
tially much larger, because of the infrastructure available in 
Mogadishu, although the latter needs massive investments to 
recover its potential efficiency. However, the mixed ethnic 
composition of the population living between the Jubba and 
the Shabelle rivers, as well as the sedentary culture of the 
Somali agriculturists living there, suggest that  d is much 
lower there than in Somaliland. Hence, this analysis empha- 
sizes that Somaliland exploited the two-dimensional  edge 
that it had over the rest of Somalia for creating its efficient 
political equilibrium. This is captured in figure 9.2 by noting 
that Somaliland’s efficient political equilibrium prevails for a 
{d, g } pair lying above the frontier, while the other parts of 
Somalia are found below that frontier. 
This finding also suggests that simply trying to export 
the solution that worked in Somaliland to the rest of Soma- 
lia would probably not bring about the same benefits. Some 
additional imagination is surely needed to devise an appro- 
priate system for the rest of Somalia with a view to create a 
lasting peace there.  Nevertheless, the  analysis presented 
here points to the two dimensions where economic and 
political innovation is required: enhancing the relative effi- 
ciency of the government at collecting revenue, relative to 
warlords and bandits; and making credible the necessary 
redistribution mechanisms for compensating the latter for 
giving up their highly lucrative violent activities. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This case study of the emerging Somaliland Republic pro- 
vides a natural experiment that sheds some useful light on 
the theory of state-building. It shows that the Hobbesian 
Leviathan is not the only path available for controlling vio- 
lence and building up a peaceful state. It suggests that a 
Lockean “horizontal social contract” model may be a viable 
solution in some circumstances, for “breaking up” a state of 
anarchy, using the expression coined by Hirshleifer (1995). 
In Somaliland, one observes a separation of the power to 
control violence, which belongs to the clans’ elders, on the 
one hand, and the power to tax and to produce some of the 
public goods that a modern state is expected to provide, on 
the  other  hand.  Among  other  things,  this  study  thus 
shows the benefit that political economists can gain from 
using the work of the social anthropologists for under- 
standing the political economy of developing countries. In 
return,  the modeling exercise demonstrates  the key part 
played by an  inherited  infrastructural  asset, namely the 
port of Berbera and the road that links it to Ethiopia. 
This model sheds some light on the political institutions 
that have been put in place in Somaliland. The key problem 
to be solved was for the business-oriented elite to delegate to 
the traditional authorities the task of controlling violence 
and banditry effectively so that Berbera became an attrac- 
tive outlet  for  the  traders  from  Ethiopia as well as for 
exporting the output  of the livestock sector. The first step 
was to help the clans’ elders to cooperate by organizing sev- 
eral local conferences. But the model shows that this is not 
enough to provide the incentives for reducing banditry to 
zero. The second step was aimed at making credible the 
promise of redistributing the enhanced fiscal resources 
resulting from the increased trade flow to the clans. A 
bicameral system was put in place to ensure that the elders 
had a key role to play in the law-making process, by giving 
them a direct access to the required information, as well as 
some veto power in the implicit bargaining problem. As 
noted, the redistribution of the fiscal resources was focused 
on the development of the education sector in all the 
regions, as one would expect in a country where genealogy 
is the key social identifier that  determines each person’s 
affiliation to a clan. The dynastic family model thus seems 
to apply perfectly in this case and explains why people felt 
compensated for their efforts by seeing their children going 
to school and to university. 
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This model may thus be viewed as an extension of Hart’s 
“Property Rights Approach” to the theory of the firm (Hart 
1995). The clan authorities can invest in providing security, 
an asset that enters the production  function for transport 
services as a complement to infrastructure. This insight is 
fundamental for understanding why a bicameral demo- 
cratic institution  lies at the heart of Somaliland’s political 
institutions, for providing a balanced representation of both 
the traditional authorities and the business-oriented mod- 
ern actors. Hence, Somaliland’s experience provides a fruit- 
ful line of arguments in favor of a qualified support for the 
traditional “project aid” doctrine, with its emphasis on 
funding infrastructural projects, which has inspired the 
action of the World Bank and other development agencies 
for decades. The qualification brought out by this case study 
is that a correct political setting is required, aimed at mak- 
ing the redistribution of the benefits from cooperation 
among the different actors credible. This redistribution  is 
the compensation due to the potential bandits for refraining 
from raiding the traders and thus participating in the effi- 
cient political equilibrium. This suggests that the inability to 
set up a correct political system, partly because of external 
interference, is what makes the infrastructural assets of 
southern Somalia, like Mogadishu’s old and new ports, its 
airport, and the “Strada Imperiale” road that links them to 
Addis Ababa, as well as the rent to sovereignty provided by 
access to foreign aid that comes with international recogni- 
tion, largely useless for producing peace. 
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8 ⎛ ⎛ 
APPENDIX   PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
 
Assume that both players adopt the standard trigger strategy 
(see, for example, Gibbons 1992). If they choose to cooper- 
ate and  refrain from  raiding the  traders  with a view to 
receiving the transfer g from the government, the potential 
syndicated bandits receive the following present value: 
2. Markakis (1992) provides a regional perspective on the 
ports in the Horn of Africa. 
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